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The San Francisco Bay (hereinafter "Bay') is both a
major center of maritime commerce and an estuary/wetland
complex of worldwide significance. Since the time of
European settlement, the Bay's two identities have been in
competition, most often to the detriment of its natural
resources. Over the past fifteen years, however, the struggle
between the interests of commerce and those of estuarine
protection has resulted in a near shutdown of channel deep-
ening and maintenance dredging projects that are essential
to maintaining the maritime industry.
How did this happen? Simply put, there was no longer
any place to put material dredged from the Bay's harbors
and ports. More pointedly, the relevant players' could not
agree upon a disposal site. Federal public works law and
policy have long favored aquatic disposal, often to the exclu-
sion of other more environmentally-beneficial solutions.
The Sonoma Baylands Project (hereinafter"Baylands- or
"Prolect") is one such alternative. By using dean dredge
material from the deepening of the Port of Oakland (here-
inafter "Port") to recreate tidal wetlands, the Project gar-
nered support from all the involved parties and created a
new national model for federal dredging projects. The
Baylands also serves as a case study on the resistance of
federal bureaucratic systems to innovation and change.
BACKGROUND
Maritime Industry
The Bay is home to the ports of Oakland. San Francisco.
and Richmond and is the fifth largest export and marine
trade center in the United States. This port activity accounts
for over 100,000 jobs in the region and S5.4 billion in annu-
al economic benefits. However the ports are dependent
upon the deepening of their channels to accommodate the
new, larger container vessels to compete effectively in the
trans-Pacific shipping market. The Port, the largest of the
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Bay ports, began trying to deepen its channels to
-42 feet below mean sea level (hereinafter "MSL") in
the early 1980's. In 1986, the United States Congress
authorized this deepening project in the Water
Resources Development Act2 (hereinafter "VRDA'),
the public works act for the U.S. Army Corps, of
Engineers (hereinafter "Corps"). Frustrated by the
lack of a disposal site to complete its dredging pro-
ject, the Port has seen its market share of Pacific
container cargo slip from 37% to 15% during the
past ten years.
For the past two decades, Bay Area ports dis-
posed of their material at the in-Bay aquatic dis-
posal site located off Alcatraz Island. Not only is
this site filling up, but in-Bay disposal has been
cited as a prime factor in the decline of fish species
in the Bay.
Ocean disposal of dredge material is equally
problematic. Commercial fishermen and environ-
mentalists sued to block disposal near Half Moon
Bay in May of 1988.'
The suit was filed under the California Coastal
Act, the federal Coastal Zone Management Act, and
the California Environmental Quality Act. In June of
1988, an injunction issued to prohibit ocean dump-
ing, effectively halting the dredging. Shortly there-
after the Port and the Corps abandoned the concept
of aquatic disposal at the near shore location.
In 1991, the U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency (hereinafter "EPA"), acting under the Marine
Protection, Research and Sanctuaries Act,4 began
the technical studies to designate an ocean dispos-
al site in the deep water up to sixty miles outside
the Golden Gate. While dumping at this depth and
location seems environmentally less destructive
than at the near shore, much is still unknown about
the long-term effects of ocean disposal on marine
life. Commercial fishermen and coastal/ocean envi-
ronmentalists cautiously endorsed the site finally
designated by the EPA in July of 1994, making pos-
sible its use for disposal of material from the
Oakland project that would not be used at the
Baylands. We believe that the Baylands component
of the Oakland project was important in making
ocean disposal acceptable to these interest groups,
because it signified that the ocean site need not be
the only receptacle for dredge material. Indeed,
these groups continue to support a more compre-
hensive approach to future dredge disposal
options, using the ocean site as a last resort, and
are actively working to encourage and establish wet-
land creation and other "upland" alternatives.
The San Francisco Bay Ecosystem
The Bay is the largest estuary on the Pacific
coast of California. It is the single most valuable
area for wintering shorebirds using the Pacific fly-
way. Waterfowl also depend heavily on the Bay. All
these birds come to the Bay to feed and require pro-
ductive intertidal baylands to survive the winter.
Salt, brackish, and freshwater wetlands once
formed a broad ring around the shoreline of the
Bay. As Europeans and Americans settled the area
over the past 150 years, they diked off and filled in
nearly eighty percent of these marshes. Tidal marsh-
es were particularly hard hit, reduced to a mere ten
percent of their historic acreage. This loss of tidal
wetlands caused several endemic species to
become endangered and listed under the federal
Endangered Species Act (hereinafter "ESA"),5 most
notably the salt marsh harvest mouse and the
California clapper rail. Despite best efforts at con-
servation over the past ten to fifteen years, both
species continue to decline.
RESTORING THE SONOMA BAYLANDS
In 1988, the California State Coastal
Conservancy (hereinafter "Conservancy") and the
Sonoma Land Trust (hereinafter "Land Trust") pur-
chased the 830-acre Baylands property as an open
space preservation and potential resource enhance-
ment project. Once a tidal marsh, the property was
diked off from the tide around the turn of the cen-
tury for hay production. As the site was farmed, the
land subsided. The elevation of the hayfield was
-2.0 to -4.0 feet below MSL and retained little of its
wetland character. The former tidal marsh was now
trisected by a railroad berm and a highway; both of
these transportation corridors were at elevations at
or slightly above 0.0 feet MSL, The only portion of
the site that could be feasibly restored to a tidal
system was the 340-acre parcel adjoining the Bay,
Large levees would be needed to isolate the parcel
and keep the neighboring lands from being flooded
by the tide.
After purchasing the site, the Conservancy
decided to proceed with the detailed studies neces-
sary to restore the tidal wetland and recreate habi-
tat for the endangered species. These studies would
also evaluate the use of clean dredge material from
several of the port deepening projects. A careful and
thoughtful plan was necessary to protect the envi-
ronmental integrity of the Project as well as to pro-
2. 33 U.S.C. § 2201 (West 1994).
3. County of San Mateo v. Port of Oakland, No. 329870, (San
Mateo County Superior Court, May 1988).
4. 33 U.S.C. § 1401 (West 1994),
5. 16 U.S.C. § 1531 (West 1994).
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vide a benefit to industry. The Conservancy and the
Land Trust would produce the design for a wetland
using dredge material which focused on the best
method for a successful wetland, not on how to
maximize disposal.
The design was completed for both a marsh
created through natural sedimentation processes
and also for a marsh that uses dredge material to
speed up the development of vegetation. Once the
perimeter levee was built and the site opened up to
the tide, it would remain an open water basin for
many years. Although natural sedimentation rates
are high in this area of the Bay, Nature would take
fifty years to establish the elevations necessary for
vegetated tidal marsh. The salt marsh harvest
mouse and the California clapper rail both depend
on vegetated marsh and might not ever benefit from
such a long-term restoration project.
The use of dredge material could reduce the
time frame for development of the vegetated marsh
to a mere ten years. Clearly, this approach would be
to the advantage of the endangered species. Two
major environmental questions had to be answered
before the Baylands could offer a true solution to
both environmental and industrial problems: (1)
how much material was needed to speed up the
evolution of the wetland without overfilling the site;
and (2) were there adequate amounts of clean
material in channel deepening projects to do this?
The design team surveyed and evaluated the
physical and biological features of several wetland
sites around the Bay which had used dredge mater-
ial. From these evaluations a maximum fill eleva-
tion was determined of +2.0 feet above MSL. The
design concept was to create a site where the tide
would sculpt the material and create a system of
tidal slough channels, the arteries of the new wet-
land. Overfilling to the final elevation of the marsh
(+3.5 feet above MSL) would result in a lack of chan-
nels and a less diverse and productive wetland. The
design would instead mimic the natural system and
only use the dredge material to speed natural
processes. With this fill criteria of +2.0 feet above
MSL, the Baylands could accommodate 2.5 to 3.0
million cubic yards of dredge material, or approxi-
mately one third of the Oakland material.
The quality of the sediment was another major
concern. Since the traditional answer to disposal of
dredge material was aquatic dumping, there weren't
any separate standards governing the quality of
material used to create wetlands. The EPA has the
review authority over sediment quality for ocean
disposal and has created a set of standards termed
the "green book." Given this situation, the
Conservancy chose to apply the ocean standards to
all sediment bound for the Baylands.
Dredge material was subjected to a. series of
chemical tests and bioassays which evaluated the
toxicity of water and sediment to various species of
zooplankton. In addition, the Corps' research center
the Waterways Experiment Station, completed
bioaccumulation tests on the material from two of
the deepening projects. These tests involved growing
wetland plants and animals on the dredge material
under laboratory conditions and testing their tissues
for uptake of any toxins. The tests showed no signif-
icant uptake even for the most polluted sediments.
However, just to be sure, the Conservancy decided to
accept only those materials which tested clean under
the ocean disposal criteria.
A final analysis reviewed the cost for using the
Baylands as a disposal site for either the Port of
Richmond's or the Port of Oakland's federally-autho-
rized channel-deepening projects. The detailed cost
analysis showed that the Baylands was cost-compet-
itive with ocean disposal. The Project appeared to
offer a real answer to several problems.
IMPLEMENTING A NEW IDEA:
THE ROLE OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
A new idea that can help td resolve a crisis
while serving the purposes of many divergent inter-
ests can quickly gain support and bring opposing
factions together. The Baylands could make benefi-
cial use of a large amount of dredge material at. or
slightly above, the cost for deep ocean disposal.
This solution had both major environmental bene-
fits in restoring a 340-acre hayfield as endangered
species habitat and also major economic benefits in
assisting in a large dredging project. Such an attrac-
tive solution quickly gained momentum and a
broad range of supporters. However, such popular
and wide-ranging support did not change the poli-
cies and actions of the two major federal agencies
charged with solving the dredging dilemma and
recovering endangered species. An Act of Congress
and a Presidential directive would be necessary to
overcome the bureaucratic resistance to change.
The story of the political actions necessary to com-
plete the Baylands has broad policy implications
and stands as a case history in the problems of
reforming the federal government to make it
responsive to changing public needs.
Legislative Actions
By early 1991. the Conservancy had a sound sci-
entific and engineering basis for proposing the use
of dredge material for wetland restoration and was
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able to meet with all the concerned elected officials,
government agencies, special interest groups, and
ports to explain the proposal. The response was
overwhelmingly positive. The entire Bay Area
Congressional Delegation, most of the federal and
state regulatory agencies, and the environmental
and business interests expressed support. The
exception was the Corps, the very agency charged
by Congress with responsibility for carrying out the
dredging necessary for federal navigation projects
and for protecting the nation's wetlands.
Most major dredging of the nation's harbors
and ports is carried out by the Corps under the
authority of the WRDA. The WRDA provides gener-
ally for cost-sharing between the Corps and a non-
federal sponsor of a navigation improvement pro-
ject, such as a port. However, it makes the non-fed-
eral sponsor fully responsible for the costs of the
acquisition of interests in property necessary to the
project, the costs of providing dredge material dis-
posal areas, and the costs of any modifications,
known as "betterments," made at the request of the
non-federal sponsor. Amendments to the WRDA
enacted in 1986,6 and 1990,7 recognized the benefits
of environmental enhancement and emphasized
the environmental protection mission of the Corps.
These amendments established a long-term goal to
increase the quality and quantity of the nation's
wetlands and authorized the Corps to undertake
wetlands restoration projects to demonstrate the
feasibility of such projects as a means of attaining
that goal. These amendments did not seem to affect
the Corps' determination to proceed with the
Oakland Harbor dredging project in the same way it
always had: by dumping the dredged material in the
Bay or ocean.
Bay Area Congressional Representatives were
surprised to discover that specific authorization
would be needed for the Corps to undertake a pro-
ject that involved wetland restoration rather than
the traditional disposal method of aquatic dump-
ing. Under the WRDA, the Corps was specifically
authorized to dredge and deepen the Oakland
Harbor channels to a depth of -42 feet below MSL.
The authorization did not provide for construction
of levees or the placement of dredge material at the
Baylands site. The Corps opposed the notion of
wetland restoration on such a large scale or as a
solution to the dredging problem in the Bay. It was
bound by policy to rule out all other disposal
options first, and it considered the Baylands too
expensive, despite the detailed cost estimates
showing otherwise. It was clear.that implementing
6. Pub. L. No. 99-662, 4 907, 100 Stat. 4188 (1986).
7. Pub. L. No. 101-640. §§ 306-307, 104 Stat. 4635 (1990).
the Project would require changing the Corps' poli-
cies and require a large, politically powerful support
group.
In response to this need for support, the
Conservancy's Project manager began to create a
coalition of all the parties interested in dredging
and the wetland restoration project. Organized
labor, maritime business, industry, ports, regulatory
agencies, environmental groups, and others would
all benefit. But these organizations rarely worked
together. Each group had to be approached sepa-
rately and convinced that backing the Baylands was
vital and that their assistance was crucial. A partic-
ularly important group for the Project was the Bay
Dredging Action Coalition (hereinafter "BDAC"), a
newly-formed alliance of industry, labor, and com-
munity leaders, which made the Baylands a corner-
stone of its political agenda. The BDAC letterhead
listed shipping lines, chambers of commerce,
numerous trade unions, and others. The Project
now had the broad-based support it needed to chal-
lenge the federal system.
While environmental groups supported the
Project, it was largely this powerful coalition that
pushed the Baylands through the system, helping
the Bay Area Congressional Delegation to overcome
the Corps' resistance. In the 1992 WRDA,8 Congress
specifically directed the Corps to complete final
engineering designs, to build the first stage of the
Project, including the new levee, and to place clean
dredged material on the site for the purpose of
restoring a wetland.
The federal public works system that for so
many years had produced dams, flood control pro-
jects, and other environmentally-damaging devel-
opments, treated this major habitat restoration pro-
ject as one of its own. The pork-barrel system was
made to work for environmental improvements.
Such a change could only have happened in the San
Francisco Bay Area, and even here it only happened
because of the dedicated and powerful
Congressional Delegation and the coalition of busi-
ness and labor forces. In the waning days of the
Bush Presidency, the Baylands slipped into this sys-
tem.
A Surprising Setback
Following this victory, support for the Baylands
became even stronger. In 1993, a major push was
made to get the Corps to begin the work authorized
by Congress and have the Baylands ready on the
same schedule as the Port's channel deepening pro-
ject. Individuals previously on opposite sides of
8. Pub. L. No. 102-580, § 106, 106 Stat. 4797 (1992)
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every major issue regarding the Bay attended a
meeting with representatives from the Corps' head-
quarters and voiced unanimous support for the
Baylands. Under enormous political pressure, the
Corps agreed to proceed with the next steps in
design for the Project.
The U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (hereinafter
"FWS"), the federal agency with principal responsi-
bility for the protection and recovery of endangered
species, responded to the Baylands with a very neg-
ative letter and recommended that the Project be
denied. The FWS requested a number of additions
to the Project, the most controversial of which
introduced the assumption that tidal marsh
restoration required mitigation for environmental
impacts. Specifically. theBaylands hayfield retained
low spots that ponded water in very wet years and
thus created "seasonal" wetlands. The Corps had
determined that fifty-six acres of such wetland
existed on the site. The Conservancy and the other
agencies involved had agreed that a fully tidal 300-
acre wetland would provide such high value habitat
that it would more than compensate for the loss of
these occasionally ponded hayfields. But the FWVS
recommended that several hundred more acres of
seasonal wetlands be created on another site as
mitigation. This condition would be expensive to
accommodate and could set a precedent making
future restoration projects impossible.
Perhaps the most difficult part of this request
was its timing. The FWS had participated in the
Project for four years and had contributed to both
the concept and the specific design. Why did it only
now bring up such a fundamental issue?
The other agencies-the EPA, the Regional
Water Quality Control Board (hereinafter
"RWQCB"), the San Francisco Bay Conservation and
Development Commission (hereinafter "BCDC"),
the California Department of Fish and Game, and
even the Corps itself-stood firmly in opposition to
the FWS' contention that tidal restoration projects
required mitigation. Environmental groups, howev-
er. were split into two camps by this new require-
ment. On one side were those who had fought
ocean and Bay dumping and saw the Baylands as an
environmentally-beneficial answer to the dredging
dilemma. On the other side were people passion-
ately concerned with seasonal wetlands and fearful
of their destruction by future tidal restoration pro-
jects. After many emotionally-charged months of
debate, the Conservancy brokered a compromise. It
offered to immediately begin the effort to restore
seasonal wetlands on another nearby 250-acre par-
cel, a project consistent with our future plans for
this site, and to add 24 acres of seasonally-ponded
area to the Baylands site.
These concessions would not be permit condi-
tions and therefore would not set a precedent for
requiring mitigation for other wetland restoration
projects. Eventually. both the FWS and the environ-
mental organizations that had supported the PIVS"
position withdrew their opposition to the Project.
The final victory occurred in a particularly grand
fashion. in December of 1993, President Bill Clinton
endorsed the Project as a part of the Port's dredging
effort.' In the wake of large-scale military base clo-
sures, the Port was seen as especially vital to the
local economy. The dedication and hard work of
Congressional Representatives. most particularly
Ron Dellums (and Lee Halterman of his staff), gave
the Baylands the boost it needed. A White House
task force was created to move forward the dredging
and the Project. Local Corps staff, many of whom
had long supported the Project despite the reluc-
tance at their headquarters, formed a partnership
with the Conservancy that has since brought the
Project to construction.
The Need for Reform
An Act of Congress'0 and a Presidential direc-
tive were necessary to overcome the national policy
of the Corps-the National Economic Development
Alternative (hereinafter "NED")-to permit restora-
tion of the Baylands as the solution to the Port's
dredging impasse." This policy applies to all Corps
projects. It directs that, in the consideration of
alternative options, the NED, defined to be the least
cost environmentally acceptable alternative for
achieving the congressionally-authorized project.
be selected." As applied to the environmental
aspects of a project, the emphasis is on the (barely)
acceptable. Any costs to achieve a different or more
environmentally-beneficial project are borne by the
non-federal sponsor.
While on the surface such a policy directive
would appear to reflect sound fiscal decisions, the
elements used in the evaluation of the alternatives
are severely limited, rarely leaving any choice but
the traditional method of aquatic disposal. Capital
construction costs alone are considered with no
allowance made for the creation of environmental
benefit or the long-term damage produced by an
option. This narrowly-defined analysis, while easily
9. Letter from President Bill Clinton to Representative Ron
Dellums (December 3. 1993).
10. Pub. L No. 102-580, § 106, 106 Stat. 4797 (1992).
11. US Army Corps of Engineers. ER 1105-2-I00 (Dec. 20.
19M),
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predictable in outcome, does not always achieve
the maximum benefit for the public dollars invest-
ed. The use of the Baylands as a disposal site
increased the cost of the overall dredging project
less than five percent over ocean disposal. Yet the
Baylands achieved two major public benefits: wet-
land restoration and improved commerce. The first
benefit was never quantified or even considered in
the NED for the Oakland project, despite explicit
language in the WRDA suggesting that it should
have been otherwise. It should not require a
Presidential directive to have the federal govern-
ment use its authority to maximize public benefits
in its projects.
Corps and FWS bureaucrats exhibited enor-
mous resistance to new ideas and change for sever-
al reasons. The Corps' strict adherence to its NED
policy is only the most striking example of a stric-
ture derived from longstanding practice and
imposed to ill effect upon a project, like the
Baylands, which differs radically from traditional
models. The cost-sharing agreement between the
Corps and the Conservancy, for example, was
derived from model agreements developed for flood
control projects. Any deviation from the model, no
matter how necessary for implementation of the
Project (or how inapposite the model), had to be
justified at multiple levels of the Corps organization
and defended against charges of being "highly
unusual." Virtually every point of negotiation ulti-
mately required approval at the highest levels.
The multiple layers of review and the institu-
tional expectation that project implementation is a
long-term undertaking make cost-sharing a project
with the Corps an expensive proposition. The Corps
estimated its staff costs for the Port's project at $22
million, which is more than half the cost of the
dredging construction contract for the entire pro-
ject. Much of this cost must be attributed to the
multi-layered review process and to the years of
project delays that resulted from the Corps' stead-
fast insistence on aquatic disposal. Neither the
Conservancy, the Port, nor the EPA accrued staff
costs at a rate even close to that of the Corps.
The resistance of the FWS to the Baylands was
of a different variety but also rooted in the conserv-
ative nature of bureaucracies. The FWS appeared to
view the Project differently once the Port became a
clear and active partner with the Conservancy. In the
eyes of the FWS, the Project moved from being a
wetland restoration project to an industrial/devel-
opment project even though none of the Project
features had in any way changed. Accustomed to
having to constantly fight development Interests
over the protection of Bay wetlands, FWS personnel
responded almost reflexively to the Port's involve-
ment. The FWS sought to apply standards to the
Project that were inconsistent with the Project's
demonstrated environmental impacts and with the
conditions applied to other wetland restoration
projects, but were more consonant with a develop-
ment project on the site. Again, the creative fea-
tures of the Project, in this case a varied political
coalition, caused a conservative and resistant
response from the federal agency.
Despite overwhelming political support from a
powerful Congressional Delegation, which included
three committee chairmen, as well as from the
White House, these two federal bureaucracies
actively fought the Project. This situation demon-
strates how little influence elected officials often
have over the federal bureaucracies they are some-
times blamed for having created. It does not always
have to be that way. The EPA, for example, was an
adamant supporter of the Project. Innovation and
creative problem-solving was encouraged by the
agency, and the EPA was a very strong voice in
White House meetings between the federal agen-
cies. EPA personnel could have viewed their role as
limited to the designation of the ocean site, but
they perceived that there were multiple interests at
stake and more than one solution to the problem,
We believe that federal resistance to the Project
had little to do with the political party in power, but
more with institutionalized opposition to change,
Individuals working within these large bureaucra-
cies who sought to respond to problems with inno-
vative solutions were too often stymied by "the way
things are done" to be able to accomplish the tasks
necessary to move the Project forward. We fre-
quently had to call upon political resources to force
an outcome that everyone wanted. The traditional
approach of the Corps to dredging projects
acknowledged none of the constraints imposed by
current developments in the maritime industry or
by environmental considerations. The Baylands rep-
resents only a partial means of disposing of mater-
ial from one of many dredging projects that will
have to be undertaken in the future if the Bay is to
be, and remain, competitive in maritime commerce,
Necessary and timely channel deepening to keep
the Bay Area's international fleet of container ships
competitive will never occur if federal policies and
organizations continue to discourage innovation.
13. See 33 U.S.C. § 2284 (West 1994) (*In the evaluation by the
Secretary of benefits and costs of a water resources project, the
benefits attributable to measures included in a project for the pur-
pose of environmental quality, Including the improvement of the
environment and fish and wildlife enhancement, shall be deemed
to be at least equal to the costs of such measures,').
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Federal legislation may be required to change
the implementation of prolects under the WRDA to
promote the realization of a broader range of public
benefits through innovative means. Institutional
changes are difficult to bring about; budget cuts are
unlikely to result in more creative or open-minded
federal bureaucracies. A more useful strategy may
be reducing the role of the Corps in project plan-
ning and analysis of alternatives and turning this
responsibility over to the states, with the Corps
retaining its role in project construction.
This appears to be the thinking among those
involved in the Long Term Management Strategy
(hereinafter "LTMS"), a 50-year blueprint for dispos-
al of material dredged from the Bay. The LTMS man-
agement agencies-the EPA, the RWVQCB. the
Corps, and the BCDC-have all endorsed the inclu-
sion of wetland creation using dredge material as a
primary component of this strategy.
Both the management agencies and the larger
LTMS committee (which includes industry, environ-
mental groups, business, labor, and many public
agencies) recently endorsed the concept of having
the State of California take on the acquisition and
development of "upland" sites for the beneficial use
of dredge material under a federal grant program
from the Corps. Agencies such as the Conservancy
are better suited to implement creative solutions
and can do so at considerably lower staff cost.
Throughout the process of implementing the
Baylands, the six state agencies involved worked in
cooperative fashion towards achieving a successful
end point. Disagreements were resolved, and all
were in support of the Project with no greater politi-
cal mandate or pressure having been applied. It is
likely this concept of transferring some of the federal
role to the State of California for Bay Area dredging
projects will be proposed in 1995 WRDA legislation.
CONCLUSION
The Baylands is more than just a tidal restora-
tion project or a creative answer to a port's dredging
problem. It represents an ideal: the transformation
of a situation in which animosity and conflict dom-
inate to a peaceful and beneficial settlement.
backed by a successful political coalition. In
California, where diversions are often stronger than
alliances, the Baylands is a unique victory, demon-
strating the ability of diverse people to agree, coop-
erate, and accomplish great things together.

